

## Chapter 3

# Stochastic Discount Factors

**3.1.** Assume there are two possible states of the world:  $\omega_1$  and  $\omega_2$ . There are two assets, a risk-free asset returning  $R_f$  in each state, and a risky asset with initial price equal to 1 and date-1 payoff  $\tilde{x}$ . Let  $R_d = \tilde{x}(\omega_1)$  and  $R_u = \tilde{x}(\omega_2)$ . Assume without loss of generality that  $R_u > R_d$ .

- (a) What inequalities between  $R_f$ ,  $R_d$  and  $R_u$  are equivalent to the absence of arbitrage opportunities?

**Solution:** The payoff of a zero-cost portfolio is  $\phi(\tilde{R} - R_f)$  for some  $\phi$ . For this to be nonnegative in both states and positive in one state, we must have either (i)  $\phi > 0$  and  $R_u > R_d \geq R_f$  or (ii)  $\phi < 0$  and  $R_f \geq R_u > R_d$ . Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for the absence of arbitrage opportunities is that  $R_u > R_f > R_d$ .

- (b) Assuming there are no arbitrage opportunities, compute the unique vector of state prices, and compute the unique risk-neutral probabilities of states  $\omega_1$  and  $\omega_2$ .

**Solution:** Let  $q_d$  denote the state price of state  $\omega_1$  and  $q_u$  the state price of state  $\omega_2$ . The

state prices satisfy

$$q_d R_f + q_u R_f = 1,$$

$$q_d R_d + q_u R_u = 1.$$

The unique solution to this system of equations is

$$q_d = \frac{R_u - R_f}{R_f(R_u - R_d)}, \quad \text{and} \quad q_u = \frac{R_f - R_d}{R_f(R_u - R_d)}.$$

The risk neutral probabilities are  $q_d R_f$  and  $q_u R_f$ .

- (c) Suppose another asset is introduced into the market that pays  $\max(\tilde{x} - K, 0)$  for some constant  $K$ . Compute the price at which this asset should trade, assuming there are no arbitrage opportunities.

**Solution:** The asset should trade at  $q_u \max(x_u - K, 0) + q_d \max(x_d - K, 0)$ , where  $x_d$  denotes the value of  $\tilde{x}$  in state 1 and  $x_u$  the value of  $\tilde{x}$  in state 2.

**3.2.** Assume there are three possible states of the world:  $\omega_1$ ,  $\omega_2$ , and  $\omega_3$ . Assume there are two assets: a risk-free asset returning  $R_f$  in each state, and a risky asset with return  $R_1$  in state  $\omega_1$ ,  $R_2$  in state  $\omega_2$ , and  $R_3$  in state  $\omega_3$ . Assume the probabilities are  $1/4$  for state  $\omega_1$ ,  $1/2$  for state  $\omega_2$ , and  $1/4$  for state  $\omega_3$ . Assume  $R_f = 1.0$ , and  $R_1 = 1.1$ ,  $R_2 = 1.0$ , and  $R_3 = 0.9$ .

- (a) Prove that there are no arbitrage opportunities.

**Solution:** Let  $\tilde{R}$  denote the risky asset return. A zero-cost portfolio has payoff  $\phi(\tilde{R} - R_f)$  for some  $\phi$ . This equals  $0.1\phi$  in state 1,  $0$  in state 2, and  $-0.1\phi$  in state 3. Obviously, there is no  $\phi$  such that  $\phi(\tilde{R} - R_f)$  is nonnegative in all states and positive in some state.

- (b) Describe the one-dimensional family of state-price vectors  $(q_1, q_2, q_3)$ .

**Solution:** State prices must satisfy

$$q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1$$

$$1.1q_1 + q_2 + 0.9q_3 = 1.$$

Subtracting the top from the bottom shows that  $q_3 = q_1$  and substituting this into the first shows that  $q_2 = 1 - 2q_1$ .  $q_1$  is arbitrary.

(c) Describe the one-dimensional family of SDFs

$$\tilde{m} = (m_1, m_2, m_3),$$

where  $m_i$  denotes the value of the SDF in state  $\omega_i$ . Verify that  $m_1 = 4$ ,  $m_2 = -2$ ,  $m_3 = 4$  is an SDF.

**Solution:** Stochastic discount factors are given by

$$m_1 = q_1/(1/4) = 4q_1, \quad m_2 = q_2/(1/2) = 2 - 4q_1, \quad m_3 = q_3/(1/4) = 4q_1,$$

with  $q_1$  being arbitrary. Taking  $q_1 = 1$  yields  $m_1 = 4$ ,  $m_2 = -2$ ,  $m_3 = 4$ .

(d) Consider the formula

$$\tilde{y}_p = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{y}] + \text{Cov}(\tilde{X}, \tilde{y})' \Sigma_x^{-1} (\tilde{X} - \mathbf{E}[\tilde{X}])$$

for the projection of a random variable  $\tilde{y}$  onto the linear span of a constant and a random vector  $\tilde{X}$ . When the vector  $\tilde{x}$  has only one component  $\tilde{x}$  (is a scalar), the formula simplifies to

$$\tilde{y}_p = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{y}] + \beta(\tilde{x} - \mathbf{E}[\tilde{x}]),$$

where

$$\beta = \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y})}{\text{var}(\tilde{x})}.$$

Apply this formula with  $\tilde{y}$  being the SDF  $m_1 = 4$ ,  $m_2 = -2$ ,  $m_3 = 4$  and  $\tilde{x}$  being the risky asset return  $R_1 = 1.1$ ,  $R_2 = 1.0$ ,  $R_3 = 0.9$  to compute the projection of the SDF onto the span of the risk-free and risky assets.

**Solution:** We have  $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}] = 1$  and  $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}] = 1$  and

$$\text{cov}(\tilde{R}, \tilde{y}) = \frac{1}{4}(0.1)(3) + \frac{1}{2}(0)(-3) + \frac{1}{4}(-0.1)(3) = 0.$$

Thus, the projection is

$$\tilde{m}_p = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}] = 1.$$

(e) The projection in part (d) is by definition the payoff of some portfolio. What is the portfolio?

**Solution:**  $\tilde{m}_p$  is the payoff of holding the risk-free asset.

**3.3.** Assume there is a risk-free asset. Let  $\tilde{\mathbf{R}}$  denote the vector of risky asset returns, let  $\mu$  denote the mean of  $\tilde{\mathbf{R}}$ , and let  $\Sigma$  denote the covariance matrix of  $\tilde{\mathbf{R}}$ . Let  $\iota$  denote a vector of 1's. Derive the following formula for the SDF  $\tilde{m}_p$  from the projection formula (3.32):

$$\tilde{m}_p = \frac{1}{R_f} + \left( \iota - \frac{1}{R_f} \mu \right)' \Sigma^{-1} (\tilde{\mathbf{R}} - \mu).$$

**Solution:** From the projection formula we have:

$$\tilde{m}_p = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_p] + \text{cov}(\tilde{m}_p, \tilde{\mathbf{R}}) \Sigma^{-1} (\tilde{\mathbf{R}} - \mu)$$

When a risk-free asset exists, the mean of an SDF is  $1/R_f$ . Furthermore,

$$\text{cov}(\tilde{m}_p, \tilde{\mathbf{R}}) = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_p(\tilde{\mathbf{R}} - \mu)'] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_p \tilde{\mathbf{R}}'] - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{m}_p] \mu' = \left( \iota - \frac{1}{R_f} \mu \right)'$$

Thus,

$$\tilde{m}_p = \frac{1}{R_f} + \left( \iota - \frac{1}{R_f} \mu \right)' \Sigma^{-1} (\tilde{\mathbf{R}} - \mu).$$

**3.4.** Suppose two random vectors  $\tilde{X}$  and  $\tilde{Y}$  are joint normally distributed. Explain why the orthogonal projection (3.32) equals  $E[\tilde{Y}|\tilde{X}]$ .

**Solution:** Let  $\tilde{Y}_p$  denote the projection (3.32), so we have  $\tilde{Y} = \tilde{Y}_p + \tilde{\varepsilon}$  with  $\tilde{Y}_p$  being an affine function of  $\tilde{X}$  and  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$  being orthogonal to  $\tilde{X}$ . Then,

$$E[\tilde{Y} | \tilde{X}] = E[\tilde{Y}_p | \tilde{X}] + E[\tilde{\varepsilon} | \tilde{X}] = \tilde{Y}_p + E[\tilde{\varepsilon} | \tilde{X}].$$

Now, because  $\tilde{\varepsilon} = \tilde{Y} - \tilde{Y}_p$ , which is a linear combination of the joint normal random vectors  $\tilde{X}$  and  $\tilde{Y}$ , it follows that  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$  and  $\tilde{X}$  are joint normal. Hence, because they are uncorrelated, they are actually independent and consequently mean-independent. This implies that  $E[\tilde{\varepsilon} | \tilde{X}] = 0$ , so

$$E[\tilde{Y} | \tilde{X}] = \tilde{Y}_p.$$

**3.5.** Show that, if there is a strictly positive SDF, then there are no arbitrage opportunities.

**Solution:** Assume  $\tilde{m}$  is a strictly positive SDF. If  $\tilde{x}$  is a nonnegative marketed payoff, then its price is  $E[\tilde{m}\tilde{x}] \geq 0$ , and  $E[\tilde{m}\tilde{x}] = 0$  if and only if  $\tilde{x} = 0$  with probability one. Therefore, there are no arbitrage opportunities.

**3.6.** Show by example that the law of one price can hold but there can still be arbitrage opportunities.

**Solution:** Suppose there are two possible states of the world, and the market consists of the two Arrow securities having prices  $p_i$ . Then the market is complete, and each payoff  $\tilde{x} = (x_1, x_2)$  has a unique cost  $p_1x_1 + p_2x_2$ . If  $p_1 < 0$ , then buying the first asset is an arbitrage opportunity.

**3.7.** Suppose there is an SDF  $\tilde{m}$  with the property that for every function  $g$  there exists a portfolio  $\theta$  (depending on  $g$ ) such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \tilde{x}_i = g(\tilde{m}).$$

Consider an investor with no labor income  $\tilde{y}$ . Show that his optimal wealth is a function of  $\tilde{m}$ . Hint: For any feasible  $\tilde{w}$ , define  $\tilde{w}^* = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w} \mid \tilde{m}]$ , and show that  $\tilde{w}^*$  is both budget feasible and at least as preferred as  $\tilde{w}$ , using the result of Section 1.5. Note: The assumption in this exercise is a weak form of market completeness. The exercise is inspired by Chamberlain (1988).

**Solution:** Set  $\tilde{w}^* = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w} \mid \tilde{m}]$  and  $\tilde{\varepsilon} = \tilde{w} - \tilde{w}^*$ , so we have that  $\tilde{w}$  is  $\tilde{w} = \tilde{w}^* + \tilde{\varepsilon}$ . We will show that  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$  has a zero mean and is mean-independent of  $\tilde{w}^*$ . Hence, the result of Section 1.5 shows that  $\tilde{w}^*$  is at least as preferred as  $\tilde{w}$ . Finally, we will show that  $\tilde{w}^*$  is budget feasible. This implies that  $\tilde{w}^*$  is optimal. Since  $\tilde{w}^* = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w} \mid \tilde{m}]$ , which is a function of  $\tilde{m}$ , this will complete the proof.

We have

$$\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon} \mid \tilde{m}] = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w} \mid \tilde{m}] - \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w}^* \mid \tilde{m}] = \tilde{w}^* - \tilde{w}^* = 0.$$

Also, because  $\tilde{w}^*$  is a function of  $\tilde{m}$ ,

$$\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon} \mid \tilde{w}^*] = \mathbf{E}[\mathbf{E}[\tilde{\varepsilon} \mid \tilde{m}] \mid \tilde{w}^*] = 0.$$

Therefore,  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$  has a zero mean and is mean-independent of  $\tilde{w}^*$ . Because  $\tilde{w}^*$  is a function of  $\tilde{m}$ , there exists by assumption a portfolio  $\tilde{\theta}$  with payoff equal to  $\tilde{w}^*$ . The cost of the portfolio is

$$\mathbf{E}[\tilde{m}\tilde{w}] = \mathbf{E}[\mathbf{E}[\tilde{m}\tilde{w} \mid \tilde{m}]] = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{m}\mathbf{E}[\tilde{w} \mid \tilde{m}]] = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{m}\tilde{w}^*],$$

by iterated expectations. Hence, the cost of  $\tilde{w}^*$  is the same as the cost of  $\tilde{w}$ , so  $\tilde{w}^*$  is budget feasible.

**3.8.** Suppose there is a risk-free asset. Adopt the notation of Exercise 3.7, and assume the risky asset returns have a joint normal distribution. Show that the optimal portfolio of risky assets for an investor with no labor income is  $\pi = \delta \Sigma^{-1}(\mu - R_f \iota)$  for some real number  $\delta$ , by applying the reasoning of Exercise 3.7 with  $\tilde{m} = \tilde{m}_p$ , using the formula (3.45) for  $\tilde{m}_p$  and using the results of Exercise 3.4.

**Solution:** For any budget feasible  $\tilde{w}$ , let  $\tilde{w}^* = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w} \mid \tilde{m}_p]$ . Then, as shown in Exercise 3.7,  $\tilde{w}$  equals  $\tilde{w}^*$  plus mean-independent noise, so  $\tilde{w}^*$  is preferred to  $\tilde{w}$ . Furthermore,  $\tilde{w}^*$  is budget feasible. From (3.45),

$$\tilde{m}_p - \mathbf{E}[\tilde{m}_p] = -\frac{1}{R_f}(\mu - R_f \iota)' \Sigma^{-1}(\tilde{R}^{\text{vec}} - \mu).$$

Hence,

$$\tilde{w}^* = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{w}] - \frac{1}{R_f} \left( \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{m}_p)}{\text{var}(\tilde{m}_p)} \right) (\mu - R_f \iota)' \Sigma^{-1}(\tilde{R}^{\text{vec}} - \mu).$$

This shows that the portfolio of risky assets producing  $\tilde{w}^*$  is  $\delta \Sigma^{-1}(\mu - R_f \iota)$  for

$$\delta = -\frac{1}{R_f} \left( \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{m}_p)}{\text{var}(\tilde{m}_p)} \right) = -\frac{1}{R_f} \left( \frac{\text{cov}(\tilde{w}^*, \tilde{m}_p)}{\text{var}(\tilde{m}_p)} \right),$$

the second equality following from iterated expectations.

**3.9.** Assume there is a finite number of assets, and the payoff of each asset has a finite variance. Assume the Law of One Price holds. Apply facts stated in Section 3.8 to show that there is a unique SDF  $\tilde{m}_p$  in the span of the asset payoffs. Show that the orthogonal projection of any other SDF onto the span of the asset payoffs equals  $\tilde{m}_p$ .

**Solution:** The span of the assets is a finite-dimensional subspace of  $\mathcal{L}^2$ . The law of one price states that there is a unique price  $C[\tilde{x}]$  for each  $\tilde{x}$  in the span of the payoffs. The function  $C[\cdot]$  is linear. Therefore, it has a Riesz representation  $C[\tilde{x}] = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{x}\tilde{m}_p]$  for a unique  $\tilde{m}_p$  in the span of the assets. Given any stochastic discount factor  $\tilde{m}$ , we have  $\tilde{m} = \tilde{m}^* + \tilde{\varepsilon}$ , where the orthogonal projection  $\tilde{m}^*$  is in the span of the assets and  $\tilde{\varepsilon}$  is orthogonal to the span of the assets. Hence,  $C[\tilde{x}] = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{m}\tilde{x}] = \mathbf{E}[\tilde{x}\tilde{m}^*]$  for all  $\tilde{x}$  in the span of the assets. Thus,  $\tilde{m}^*$  is also in the span of the assets and represents the price function. By the uniqueness of the Riesz representation, it must be that  $\tilde{m}^* = \tilde{m}_p$ .

